However, they are arguments against the idea that
future autonomy holds such a significant position in the parent-child
relationship. These arguments stem from the idea that it would be impractical
for future autonomy to hold such a position. In the sense that we would have
disqualify all possible situations that would result in external ideals
influencing a child. In the sense that parents would have to be limited from
carrying out their own independent fundamental rights because of the risk of transferring
their beliefs to their child. Secondly, insignificant preferences such as diet that
may not warrant as needing to be independently reviewed and that a child may be
carry out into adulthood would have to be equally be condemned. This, it is
argued would be too inconveniencing and taxing on parents. An alternative
response to these argument is that firstly, a parent has the right to pursue their
own interests as well as exercise their own fundamental rights. Thus, if a side
effect of them doing this is their child is preferences being altered
concessions can be made. Compared to a parent deliberately imposing their
belief system on their child. As Clayton states, “the duty to respect a child’s
independence does not necessarily forbid the parent from pursuing their own
interest, even if a side-effect of that pursuit is that their child develops an
allegiance to similar projects (2012:363). Furthermore some matters such as
religion and sexuality have different weight compared to that of diets. In the sense
that the former play a significant roles in shaping a person and who they are
compared to the latter. Matters such as religion have a comprehensive role on
the development of a person and that is why we can argue for prohibition of
interfering with these elements. Whilst concessions can be made for other factors
such as diets.   

Secondly, one important aspect of the argument
would be to outline the possible risks that a child is future autonomy faces if
the child raised in a religion. One could argue that a parent may raise a child
under a religion as long there is assurance that a child is future autonomy is
kept intact. However, this does not seem to be possible. There is already
general intuition that raising a child under a religion shapes their
preferences. The parent-child relationship as mentioned before is a fiduciary
one and an inevitable outcome of this is that children are in a more vulnerable
position that would allow for them to be easily shaped by their parent’s
preferences. This is even more likely to happen to children raised under a
religion as they are more likely to be influenced more than other children.
Moreover, these views are most likely to be carried on into adulthood. Fienberg
describes a process in which every decision that one makes based on these
imposed views further reinforces the views and eventually leads to a creation of
n a cycle of decision making based on those views (1992:94). Thus leading to
these views that were externally reinforced to be assimilated as one’s own mind
even though they were not one’s independent views. Secondly, if autonomy is
regarded in terms of freedom of action and judgement. People may still argue
that one has not lost their autonomy because they still have the freedom to leave
a religion if they do not agree with it. However, if a religion has been
integrated as important aspect of one’s life since childhood, chances are the
person may not be inclined to lose an important link in their life.  As Clayton states, “An individual’s revision
of her goals as an adult is more costly if her parents enrolled her into a
particular comprehensive view as a child” (2012:363).

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Building on this idea, it can be inferred that children
whose preferences have been influenced and carried on into their adulthood can
be justified as compromising their future autonomy. Furthermore parents may
also be unable to prevent this from happening as well as stop it from happening
because they are unaware. Clayton’s correlation between the parent-child
relationship and the state-citizen relationship best explains this view.
Clayton (2016:2012) argued that arguments that looked at the coercive nature of
the state-citizen relationship can be used on the parent-child relationship
because of the similarities.  Moreover,
Luke (1974) elaborates on the Marxist view of false consciousness that looks at
how the preferences of citizens are actually shaped by the state.  Thus, citizens may portray the illusion of
autonomy when in fact the states is just imposing their coercive powers in a
way that is not different from the directly influencing people’s preferences.
If we expand Clayton’s view that the relationships are similar in nature, it
can thus be argued that they are instances where a person may think they are
acting independently when in fact they are acting based on external influences
imposed on them when they were younger. Which results in their autonomy being
compromised. Furthermore, with such a childhood it cannot be wholly proven that
an adult is following their childhood religion independently even though they
claim they are. A parent can also be convinced in the same way as well thus
leading them to not recognising that the future autonomy of their child had
been compromised.  Therefore, the risks
that come with raising a child under a religion are too great to be incurred on
future autonomy and outweigh the rights of parents.

In contrast to evidence which presents
the view that raising a child under a religion can alter their
preferences thus compromising their future autonomy. An alternative perspective
illustrates that the shaping of preferences should not be treated as
importantly as other forms of restricting autonomy. In the sense that a preference
however formed is still someone is preference and should be respected because
it is there’s. As people most of our preferences are formed because we were
exposed to some external forces and to enforce such an argument would lead to
discrediting a wide range of preferences. Thus, one must favour an outcome in
order to acquire a feeling of usefulness from the outcome is the consequentialist
perspective of the argument. The outcome itself does not bring one the feeling
of utility but rather the realization of desire does. Regardless of how the
desire was realized whether it be from external forces shaping one’s preference.
In spite of this, this counter argument falls short when it comes to the case
of children being raised under a religion. This argument could apply to
instances that involve adults autonomously deciding to keep the preferences
from their childhoods. However, in terms of children the scope of the argument focuses
on limiting their future autonomy from being compromised. The issue at hand is
not how the future autonomy being compromised will manifest itself. Rather, it
is how it is being restricted and the extent to which it is being compromised. In
the sense that both direct and indirect forms on influence are equally as
damaging.  Whether a grown child is
perspectives are respected in the future can should be discusses until the
child has grown but it has no influence on raising a child by a religion limiting
their future autonomy.

As mentioned before the essay would the
implications of this argument in terms of legal rights. The parental right to
raise your child under a religion is not one that qualifies to be provoked
through the legal system. Very few theories of justices in society are
considered conclusive because we live in a world with a wide range of
perspectives in terms of justice. Thus enforcing such a law would not seem
productive for society.  Galston (2002)
argues that people need and feel and believe that they have genuine freedom to
raise their children as they feel fit in order for society to avoid anarchy
specifically in political institutions. Moreover, parents may be less motivated
to do their best in raising children because they feel that their parenting is
being monitored. As well as hindering their considered right to bring up their
children without any obstruction (Brennan and Noggle 1997). However, the law
should still play a role in cases where raising kids under a religion entails
them being harmed or them adopting oppressive and destructive views. That would
then led to them adopting a sub-par life through no fault of their own.  

 

In conclusion, the essay has demonstrated
how parents do not have a right to raise their child under a religion because
they risk restricting the future autonomy of the child. Future autonomy of the
child as the essay argued is a significant aspect of a child is welfare and
should be held at the same standard as that of an adult. Due to the unique
relationship of that of a parent and child it only follows that a parent’s
right in this instance does not supersede that of a child’s. This view may seem
to create problems in terms of parents still being able exercise their rights
without influencing their children. Parents of course should still be able to
live their lives independently as they wish where objections are made are on
purposefully imposing views on their children. Concessions are also made
depending on the comprehensive weight a factor may have on the development of children.
Lastly, the risk of ones autonomous decision making being restricted by being
raised by a religion supersedes parental rights.